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Tallent and Fishman: Collective Bargaining in the 80's: A Prospective Analysis

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE 80's:
A PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS
Stephen E. Tallent* & Burton J. Fishman**
INTRODUCTION

During the decade and a half following the Second World War,
labor-management relations were in their halcyon years. Perhaps it
was because the war had functionally suspended the normal operation
of such relations and the end of the war provided the opportunity for
expressing years of pent-up hopes and anxieties, but for any reason,2
Board rulings
the post-war period is marked by judicial decisions,'
3 which increased both the value of free
and Congressional actions
collective bargaining as the means by which "labor peace" was to be
achieved and the virtue of labor arbitration as the preferred vehicle
for dispute resolution. It is our belief that during this period, and in
large part because of the positions taken by the Board, the courts, and
Congress, labor and management made substantial progress in
establishing a structure which had the potential for solving some of
the institutional problems which confront management and labor.
The next fifteen year period, however, produced something of a
reaction. Both labor and management began to cast about for
additional means by which to improve their relative positions. In this
attempt, they joined the powerful trend that developed in the late
1950's of turning to the federal government for solutions to problems
that had heretofore rested in their own hands. If anything,
management and labor were both too successful, for they succeeded
in codifying a variety of aspects of the workplace which traditionally
had been the fruits of collective bargaining. As a result, a series of
statutes were passed which changed the patterns of labormanagement relations. Indeed, management may have started the
trend by seeking and succeeding in winning the passage of the
Gibson, Dunn & Cruteher (Washington, D.C.), J.D. University of Chicago, 1962.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (Washington, D.C.), J.D. Yale University, 1979.
U.S.
1. E.g., United States Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363
U.S.
363
Co.,
Navigation
Gulf
&
Warrior
v.
America
564 (1960); United States Steelworkers of
593
U.S.
363
Corp.,
Car
&
Wheel
Enterprise
v.
America
of
Steelworkers
United
(1960);
574
*

(1960).
124
2. E.g., General Shoe Corp. and Boat and Shoe Workers Union, A.F.L., 77 NLRB
(1948).
3. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 8(b)(1) and (3), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(b)(1) and 158(b)(3) (1976).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

1

Hofstra
Labor
Law Forum
[Vol.1 1:[1983],
1
Hofstra Labor
and
Employment
Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss.
Art. 8

LandrumzGriffin Act in 1959.4 There followed in rapid succession the
Equal Pay Act of 1963,5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 7 the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act,8 in its several iterations, the Occupational Health
and Safety Act of 1970, 9 and, as pervasive as any although not so
widely known, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974.10 Although this list is extensive, it does not
catalogue the many similar initiatives Undertaken on the state level.
With each new statute, some part of the traditional armory of the
parties to collective bargaining was removed, some consigned to the
employees' benefit and some to the employers'. Each new piece of
legislation removed something from the reservoir of offers and
demands thut constituted the collective bargaining process.
The courts, as well, contributed to the expansion of the role of
non-parties to the collective bargaining process. An illustrative
exampleil of judicial intervention in' the realm of collective bargaining
is the development of the cause of action known as the "duty of fair
representation." In a series of decisions culminating in Vaca v.
Sipes,i 2 the courts effectively created a federal cause of action for
individual employees who felt unfairly treated by their collective
bargaining representatives or by the contract those representatives
negotiated. The impact of "duty of fair representation" litigation is
well known to all those familiar with grievance arbitration. Surely, no
arbitrator is unfamiliar with receiving a grievance in which the
"'message" is also transmitted that the parties would
not be arbitrating
the grievance but for some legal advice that the possibility of a duty of
fair representation suit alone makes arbitration a better and less
expensive method of resolving the problem, even though the
arbitrator and, perhaps, the parties realize that the grievance is
without merit.1 3
4.
5.
6.
7.

Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
§ 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
§ 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976).

8.

§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).

9. § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
10. § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
11. It is not possible within the narrow confines of this paper adequately to explore the
development of case lav in any one of the areas mentioned above. "Illustrative examples" must
suffice. We recognize that examples illustrating a contrary point can be found, but maintain,
nonetheless, that the general trend we identify accurately reflects the developing case law.
12. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
13. The Supreme Court has again made clear that a union refuses to pursue a member's
grievance at its peril. In Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service, 51 U.S.L.W. 4051 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983)
(No. 81-525), the Court held that where the union has breached its "duty of fair representation"
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If the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act is a convenient marker
for the beginning of the period of the growth of governmental
involvement in matters previously the substance of collective
bargaining, then, as convenient a marker for the end of the era is the
failure of the Labor Law Reform Act of 1978.4a As is the case with
most significant markers, it is really an event around which other
events coalesce and give meaning to each other. It is our view that
since 1978 it has been the tendency of the Burger Court and the
Board to reflect the mood of Congress and join in the general trend of
returning the burdens and benefits of collective bargaining to the
parties.
THE "RULES" GOVERNING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
WILL NOT BE CHANGED

Supreme Court Rulings
Beginning, perhaps, in 1977 with TWA v. Hardison,15 in which
the Court ruled that Title VII's ban against religious discrimination
requires only that an employer make "reasonable" attempts to
accommodate the religious needs of an employee, the Court has made
clear that it was joining the movement to leave collective bargaining
parties to their own devices with the "rules" more or less unchanged.
Hardison was followed soon thereafter by NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago.16 Although broadly and properly construed as a First
Amendment case, what was also at issue was the Board's continuing
expansion of its jurisdiction over elements of the work force that were
only questionably within the Board's Congressionally established
ambit. In the Catholic Bishop case, the Court held that the Board is
not permitted to assert its jurisdiction over lay faculty at
church-operated schools when such an assertion would necessarily
entangle the Board in religious affairs in violation of the First
17
Amendment.
by failing to take a member's valid grievance to arbitration, the affected employee may sue both
the employer and the union for damages and collect from both. See also Scott v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 496 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974) (jury may properly
determine the legal effect of the grievance procedures in a collective bargaining agreement).
Discovering a means of limiting the countless arbitrations which the Bowen ruling very likely
will generate is one of the more pressing challenges facing collective bargainers in the '80's. See
infra, for a discussion of UPS v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), which may define a limit to "duty
of fair representation" causes of action.
14. Labor Law Reform Act of 1978, S. 2467 and H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
15. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
16. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
17. The Court, however, relied as much on the scope of the National Labor Relations Act
the absence
[29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)] as it did on the Constitution in rendering its decision: [I]n
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The holding in CatholicBishop can be seen as foreshadowing the
ruling in NLRB v. Yeshiva University.' 8 In Yeshiva, the Court took a
rather traditional, albeit controversial, view of what constitutes a
management employee. The Court held that college faculty members
who play a significant role in determining the nature and substance of
their work are outside the protections of the National Labor Relations
Act. These rulings were not, we believe, "anti-Board." Rather, they
are part of a studied effort by the Court to read the Act as establishing
legislative boundaries to the Board's jurisdiction and not merely as
having established Board authority over the uncharted territories of
"employment." That limiting attitude is further revealed in NLRB
V.
Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Board.19 There, the
Court refused to expand the "confidential employee" exclusion under
§ 2(3)20 of the Act to include an "executive secretary." Rather, the
Court ruled that only those who satisfy the Board's "labor-nexus" test,
e.g., those " 'who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons
who formulate, determine and effectuate management policies in the
field of labor relations' " can be excluded from the protections of the
21
Act.
The recent ruling in First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB 22 also has a role in the general trend we have been describing.
of a clear expression of Congress' intent to bring teachers in church-operated schools within the
jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon
the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses.
Id. at 507.
18. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).

19. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
20. § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
21. 454 U.S. at 189 citing B.F. Goodrich Company, 115 NLRB 722, 724 (1956). See also
Hi-Craft Clothing Company v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 912 (3rd Cir. 1981); supervisor has no
independent rights under the NLRA "chilling effect" argument of NLRB without merit).
22. 452 U.S. 666. The impact of FirstNational Maintenance will apparently need time to
affect the Board. In Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Company, 265 NLRB No.
28, 111 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1981), the Board found that the employer's decision to close its
assembly operations and move them to a plant in another state was a "midterm modification" of
the collective bargaining agreement in violation of § 8 (d) of the Act, even though the
employer's decision was economically motivated and not the result of union animus. First
National Maintenance was distinguished as pertaining solely to determining what issues are
mandatory subjects of negotiation. The Board noted that negotiating about the planned
relocation was not an issue in Milwaukee Spring, and, thus, FirstNational Maintenance"has no
bearing on this case." (Slip op. at 11, N. 4). For a discussion of Milwaukee Spring, see Quarterly
Report of NLRB General Counsel Lubbers (December 1981), Daily Labor Reporter No. 3
(BNA), §D (Jan. 5, 1983). The General Counsel indicates that the holding of Milwaukee Spring
applies to subcontracting as well as relocating work under § 8(a)(1) and (5).
This area of the lav promises to be one of the most active and contested in the coming
months. See, e.g., Maietta Contracting, 265 NLRB No. 161 (Dec. 16, 1982) [subcontracting of
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In FirstNational Maintenance, the Court ruled that the employer has
no duty to bargain with the union as to the decision to close down all
or part of its business. The decision becomes much less controversial
when seen as part of a larger trend of not altering the basic "rules" of
collective bargaining. The Court concluded that parties to a collective
bargaining agreement will retain their traditional economic weapons
and their obligations as partners in the undertaking but, the Court
also stressed that the parties must maintain their roles as adversaries
with individual aims and individual means.
Circuit Court Rulings
The lower courts and the Board, insofar as it is possible to find
unifying themes in so diverse a body of cases as they decide, also have
followed and participated in the trend we are describing. With a
majority of the current Board determined to recognize the rulings of
the circuit courts regarding the Board's decisions, the positions taken
by the lower courts have a new significance in labor law. Principal
among the recent decisions of the circuit courts are two concerning
the distinction between hard bargaining and surface bargaining.
In these significant decisions, the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits
both refused to enforce Board orders against employers that were
based on the Board's conclusions that the employers had engaged in
"surface bargaining" in an attempt to evade their bargaining
obligations under the Act. In both cases, the appellate courts
concluded that what was before them was simply "hard bargaining."
The Circuit Courts found that the Board's conclusions were based on
the incorrect assumption that the "acceptability" of an employer's
proposals to the union is the touchstone for bad faith. Contrary to the
Board's assumption, the Courts pointed out that good faith bargaining
does not require either party to make proposals acceptable to its
opponent.
In Pease Company v. NLRB,2 3 eighteen bargaining sessions were
held between December 15, 1976 and March 13, 1977, at which date
the case was heard by an Administrative Law Judge. The contract
between the employer and the Ohio Valley Carpenters District
Counsel had expired on February 28, 1977. Although the parties
work, laying-off employees, and sale of equipment to evade bargaining a violation of § 8(a)(1)
and (5)] and F. Landon Cartage Co., 265 NLRB No. 177 (Dec. 16, 1982) (transfer of work to
"alter egos" as a means of evading terms of contract and bargaining a violation). In both Maietta
and Landon, the Board orders the employers to reinstate employees and restore work to the
affected sites.
23. 237 NLRB 1069, 99 L.R.R.M. 1166 (1978),enforcement denied 666 F.2d 1044 (6th
Cir. 1981).
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exchanged proposals throughout January and February, on February
25, the union voted to strike as of March 1 and did so after an
unproductive negotiating session on February 28. During the strike,
the parties continued to meet. The parties were far apart on most
major issues and, indeed, hardened their positions during the strike
period. On April 13, six weeks after the strike began, the Company
withdrew its cost-of-living proposal, proposed that the union security
clause for employees hired after March I be eliminated, and proposed
that supervisors be permitted to do union work. By mid-June, the
company had hired approximately 220 replacements and its three
unionized plants were operating.
The Board found that the company had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and
(5)24 by failing to bargain in good faith and found, further, that the
strike was an unfair labor practice strike from its inception. The
appellate court reversed on all grounds. The court stated that "the
"acceptability' of its [the employer's] proposals to the
Union is the
touchstone from which all the Board's findings of bad faith emanate.
This approach has led the Board astray, because good faith bargaining
does not require the company to make proposals that are acceptable
to the Union." 25 Citing NLRB v. United Clay Mines,2 6 the court went
on to state that "a lack of good faith may not be found merely because
a party attempts to secure provisions that the other party deems
unacceptable, but rather may be found only from 'conduct clearly
showing an intent not to enter into a contract of any nature.' "27 As to
whether the Company made enough concessions on issues of
substance, the Court was extremely clear in finding the ALJ in error.
Citing its earlier decision in McCort v. CaliforniaSports, Inc.,28 the
Court stated "[N]othing in the labor law compels either party
negotiating over mandatory subjects of collective bargaining to yield
on its initial bargaining position; good faith bargaining is all that is
required."2 9 On the vexing issue of the conduct of the parties in
bargaining during the strike, the court held that simply because the
employer withdrew a proposal made prior to the strike, this was no
indication that the employer was seeking to insure that no agreement
would be reached. The Sixth Circuit also held that "[A]n employer has
the right to withdraw proposals made before a strike to reflect the

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

§§ 8(a)(1) and (5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (5).
666 F.2d at 1049.
219 F.2d 120, 125 (6th Cir. 1955).
666 F.2d at 1049. See also NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960).
600 F.2d 1193, 1200 (6th Cir. 1979).
666 F.2d at 1050.
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changed economic background." 3 0 Further, the mere fact that the
union felt it must strike was not an indication of bad faith bargaining.
The employees "have no right to insist that Company proposals be
acceptable to them without the need to resort to a strike to attempt to
gain desired concessions." 3 1 Summing up, the court cited NLRB v.
American NationalInsurance Co.,32 for the proposition that "the law
is well-settled that 'the Board may not, either directly or indirectly,
compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive
terms of collective bargaining agreements.' -33
The Ninth Circuit in Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v.
NLRB, 34 came to a similar conclusion in an unusually similar
situation. In Pittsburgh-Des Moines, the Teamsters struck two
bargaining units of the company when the two separate contracts
expired at the end of March 1979. A number of bargaining sessions
had taken place prior to the strike. In mid-May, management
proposed a two-year renewal of the old contract with two significant
changes; one to permit discharge of violators of the no-strike clause,
and the other to abandon the union's welfare and pension fund in
exchange for a qualified ERISA plan using a reliable insurance
company. After considerable bargaining on these issues, the company
prepared drafts, on June 10, incorporating the employer's two
changes. On July 12, after having heard nothing further from the
union, the employer withdrew its last contract proposal but it
suggested that negotiations continue "in the immediate future." On
July 16, in apparent response to the employer's action, the union filed
an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the company had refused
to execute a contract already agreed to by the parties. The Regional
Director advised the union that no complaint would be issued and the
union withdrew its charge. The union then signed the draft
agreements the company had sent on June 10 and forwarded them to
the company. The company responded that the proposals in the
drafts had been unconditionally withdrawn, and are, therefore,
rejected. The company stated its continued readiness to bargain and
further stated that a counterproposal would be forthcoming. On
September 11, the company's proposals were sent to the union.
Throughout-the following month, the company repeatedly offered to
negotiate, to explain its present proposals, and to consider any union
30. Id. at 1051.
31. Id. at 1049.
32. 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
33. 666 F.2d at 1051.
34. 253 NLRB 706, 106 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1980), enforcement denied 663 F.2d 956 (9th

Cir. 1981).
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counterproposals. The union consistently refused to re-open
negotiations on any grounds other than the June 10 proposals made
and withdrawn by the company.
On the basis of these facts, the Administrative Law judge
concluded that the General Counsel's contention, which found that
the company's conduct constituted "surface" bargaining, was totally
without merit. The Board concluded otherwise and overruled the
ALJ. The Board stated: "[w]e conclude that by withdrawal of its
original proposals tentatively agreed upon and by the substitution
without explanation of regressive proposals, Respondent has failed to
bargain in good faith .

.

. "35 The Ninth Circuit, exhibiting some

impatience, unanimously refused to enforce the Board's order. On
the contrary, the appellate court held that the record demonstrated a
desire on the part of the company to reach agreement "and the
union's unreasonable insistence to point of impasse that agreement
had already been reached." 36 Specifically, the court held that the
unconditional withdrawal by the company of its earlier proposal can in
no way be construed to constitute a tentative agreement by the
parties. The court went on:
We must assume that the proposal, advanced in the course of the
strike, was the result of compromise and that concessions may well
have been tendered in some areas with the hope of securing
agreement on those provisions which the Union chose to reject.
" 'To bargain collectively' does not impose an inexorable ratchet,
'
whereby a party is bound by all it has ever said."

7

Board Rulings
The influence of Pease,3 8 and Pittsburgh-DesMoines,3 9 on the
Board regarding what constitutes "surface" bargaining is seen in the
Board's recent decision in Chevron Chemical Company.40 In that
case, the Board set aside the Administrative Law Judge's decision and
dismissed a series of §§ 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) 4 1 charges, specifically for
the reasons stated in Pease and Pittsburgh-DesMoines. In Chevron,
the Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers union was involved in
35. 663 F.2d at 959, citing the Board.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 960 citing NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 883 (9th Cir.
1978). See also NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc., 584 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1978);
but see NLRB v. Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978), enforcing 220
NLRB 1389, 90 L.R.R.M. 1557 (1975).
38. 237 NLRB 1069, 99 L.R.R.M. 1166.
39. 253 NLRB 706, 106 L.R.R.M. 1001.
40. 261 NLRB No. 4, 110 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1982).
41. §§ 8(a)(3) and (5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3) and (5).
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bargaining for an initial contract for clerical employees at one of
Chevron's plants at which the union also represented the production
and maintenance workers (P and M). OCAW had bargained
successfully for the P and M Unit in the past. Over twenty bargaining
sessions were held between August 1977 and February 1978. No
contract was agreed to and, in late February, the clerical unit
membership voted to strike. Fifteen of the twenty-three clerical
employees remained on strike until May 17 when unconditional offers
to return to work were made. By then, Chevron had permanently
filled all but one of the strikers' positions. That position was offered to
the union, as was another that came open subsequently.
Based on these facts, the ALJ found that Chevron had violated
§ 8(a)(5) by bargaining in bad faith or indulging in "surface"
bargaining and that the strike was caused or prolonged by such unfair
labor practices. Consequently, the ALJ found a § 8(a)(3) violation in
that the employer failed to reinstate all strikers as unfair labor practice
strikers.
The Administrative Law Judge agreed with the General
Counsel's theory that the surface bargaining could be found on the
basis of the company's proposal of a broad management-rights clause
and a no-strike clause which were "predictably unacceptable" to the
union. Despite the fact that the company modified its initial
proposals, the ALJ concluded that even in its initial proposals, the
company had demonstrated a lack of good faith. The basis for such a
conclusion was stated by the General Counsel who noted that
Respondent's wage offer was far below what a "self-respecting" union
could take back to its members.
The Board reversed. Citing Pease and Pittsburgh-Des Moines,
42
and relying as well on NLRB v. American National Insurance Co.
43
and NLRB v. Insurance Agent's InternationalUnion, AFL-CIO the
Board agreed with the employer's contention that the ALJ erred in
basing his decision almost entirely on his own evaluation of the
substantive terms of the company's proposals and his own assessment
of whether the parties' economic weapons were "fairly" used. After
analyzing each of the contract proposals at issue, the Board concluded
that the proposals
indicate bard bargaining by both sides, each desirous of improving
its position, vis a vis the other as measured by the existing P and
M contract... Apart from the contract proposals themselves, the
conclusion that Respondent met its obligation to bargain in good
42.

343 U.S. 395 (1952).

43. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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faith is supported by other factors which we deem relevant in our
consideration of the totality of the circumstances revealed by the
record . . . [Tihe record as to the actual negotiations reflects no
refusal by Respondent to meet and confer to provide information.
It reflects no adamant refusal by Respondent to make concessions
in its bargaining positions, or failure or refusal to provide
justification for its bargaining posture. Nor does the record
suggest that the parties were at an impasse when a strike was
called. 4"
Although the annals of the Board reveal a number of instances in
which an employer's "hard bargaining" was not found to be a valid
basis for an unfair labor practice charge, in recent years, the Board
has been fairly consistent in finding that if an employer maintains a
hard bargaining stance including and beyond a strike, as part of which
more generous offers are withdrawn, a failure to bargain in good faith
will be found. 4 5 Thus, the decision in the Chevron case is quite
significant. However, the Board made clear that it was basing its
decision on the facts before it [see n. 10 of the Board's decision] and
makes no reference to the continued validity of its earlier rulings. In
any event, the reference to the recent appellate decisions indicates an
awareness by the Board that its earlier ostrich-like posture is no
longer viable. The Board's decision in Chevron, reflecting as it does a
renewed adherence to the standards voiced by the Supreme Court in
American National Insurance,46 indicates again a new pragmatism
and a willingness to leave the parties to their own devices. 4 7
In a long-awaited decision, the Board ruled that a union may not
restrict the right of members to resign before or during a strike nor
fine such members if they do resign. In Machinists Local 1327, IAM
(Dalmo Victor),48 the union's consitution made resignation within 14
days of a strike punishable by a fine. The Board held that it was an
unfair labor practice for the union to link a restriction on resignation
to the occurrence of a strike. 49 The Board's agreement ends there.
44. 261 NLRB No. 4 Slip op. at 11-12, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1008.
45. NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc. 567 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Milgo
Industrial, 567 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1977); Neon Sign Corp., 229 NLRB 861, 95 L.R.R.M. 1161
(1977); Waples-Platter Companies, 215 NLRB 483, 88 L.R.R.M. 1176 (1974); Pacific Grinding
Wheel Company, 220 NLRB 1389, 90 L.R.R.M. 1557 (1975); Dust-Tex Service, Inc., 214
NLRB 398, 88 L.R.R.M. 1292 (1974).
46. 343 U.S. 395.
47. The renewed willingness to permit the parties to work out their own differences is
seen also in the recent NLRB decisions in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, et
al, see infra notes 86-88.
48. 263 NLRB No. 141, 111 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1982).
49. Id. slip op. at 11, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1118.
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Members Fanning and Zimmerman go on to advise unions that if
they include a 30-day notice for resignation in all circumstances, they
would consider such a provision as "a reasonable accommodation
between the right of union members to resign.., and the union's
responsibility to protect the interests of employees who maintain
their membership .... .50 Chairman Van de Water and Member
Hunter, however, absolutely rejected the presumptive validity of a
30-day limitation. Describing the promulgation by their colleagues of
such a rule as "arbitrary" and "contrary to fundamental principles of
the Act," Van de Water and Hunter announced that they would
regard "the imposition of any fines or other discipline premised upon
such restrictions to be violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A)." 5 1
The result in Dalmo Victor is particularly unsatisfying, as a
conclusive decision on this issue had been awaited since the Board
first ruled in 1977.52 It appears that a "more final" ruling will have to
wait for the next "restriction on resignation case," as the issue in
Dalmo Victor is not one that will disappear. If unions can make
resignation so costly as effectively to assure that no member will
resign against the wishes of the union, then employers will be certain
to consider union security clauses as effecting a critical shift in
economic leverage and will take a bargaining position regarding such
clauses accordingly.
In another of its more recent rulings, the Board has resolved, at
least for now, the treatment of campaign propaganda along the
pragmatic lines set out in Chevron.53 In Midland National Life
Insurance Company, 54 the Board held that in a representation
election, the parties are free to engage in campaign propaganda and
puffery, the employees are free to separate the fruit from the chaff,
and the Board will not intervene to set an election aside absent the
presence of forged documentary campaign materials. In short, the
decision in Midland National Life returns the Board's position
regarding misrepresentations during an election campaign to that
5 5 That
taken previously in Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.
short-lived refinement of the holding in Hollywood Ceramics
Company, Inc. ,56 was itself supplanted in General Knit of California

50. Id. at 12, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1118.
51. Id. at 15, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1119.
52. 231 NLRB 719, 96 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1977).
53. 261 NLRB No. 4, 110 L.R.R.M. 1005.
54. 263 NLRB No. 24, 110 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1982).
55. 228 NLRB 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977).
56. 140 NLRB 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
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Inc. 5 7 With Midland National Life, the Board again adopts the
position that employees involved in a representation election are no
longer the wards of the Board's paternalism. The Board now will take
"a view of employees as mature individuals who are
capable of
recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and for discounting
it."

58

Of course, we recognize that no trend is without contraindicators. In a number of rulings of the Board, the forces of the
mid-70's (in this little schema) have prevailed. In Conair Corp.59 for
example, the Board established a new and expansive precedent.
Dividing 3-2, the Board granted a bargaining order to a union which
had never demonstrated majority support, citing, as its basis, a record
of "outrageous and pervasive" misconduct by the employer. The
Board stated that:
It is clear ... that this case is the "exceptional" type envisioned

in Gissel which warrants the issuance of a remedial bargaining
order 'without need of inquiry into majority status on the basis of
cards or otherwise.' We find that neither our traditional remedies
nor even our extraordinary access and notice remedies can
effectively dissipate the lingering effects of [the employer's]
massive and unrelenting coercive conduct. 60
Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter dissented sharply. In
another case decided on the same day, however, United
Supermarkets, Inc.,61 a unanimous Board rejected a bargaining order
when there was no demonstrated union majority despite "extensive
and serious" misconduct by the employer. Although it is true that the
57. 239 NLRB 619, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978). The "Hollywood Ceramics saga" is a topic
that by itself is a worthy subject for an article. It is an enlightening example of the application of
the Board's assumptions and preconceptions. See GETMAN, GOLDBERG AND HERMAN, UNION
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAw AND REALITY (1976) and the comments of the NLRB in
Shopping Kart, supra. Whether the Board respects the precedent established in Midland
National Life and the trend a number of its decisions have set out is an open question. It is made
all the more problematical by the fact that Chairman Van de Water's appointme..t has never
been confirmed by the Senate and, thus, his term ended when the 97th Congress adjourned. It
is likely, but by no means certain, that Van de Water's successor will follow a similar approach to
the issues as that discussed in this paper.
58. 263 NLRB No. 24 slip op. at 19, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1493, citing Shopping Kart, 228
NLRB at 1313, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705. MidlandNational Life was followed in Affiliated Midwest
Hospital (Local 73, Hospital Emp. Labor Program), 264 NLRB No. 146 111 L.R.R.M. 1425
(1982) (permitting a union misstatement of Board action) and in Daniel Constr. Co. (No. Caro.
St. Bldg. Constr. Council), 264 NLRB No. 79 (Sept. 30, 1982) (employer statement of need to
remain "competitive" is not a threat).
59. 261 NLRB No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1982).
60. Id. Slip op. at 16, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1166.
61. 261 NLRB No. 179, 110 L.R.R.M. 1173 (1982).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol1/iss1/8

12

Tallent and Fishman: Collective Bargaining in the 80's: A Prospective Analysis
1983]

Collective Bargaining -A Prospective Analysis

12,

6 2 the
Board's positions are unusually affected by the force of rhetoric,
"extensive
line between "outrageous and pervasive misconduct," and
to find
likely
are
courts
is one that the
and serious misconduct"
63
difficult to discern.
Other recent Board cases which reflect what seems to be an
the
outmoded viewpoint also demonstrate a similar disregard for
Cardinal
in
example,
For
practical realities of the workplace.
solicited
Systems, 64 the Board ruled that an employer who unlawfully
the
reimburse
must
workers to revoke dues checkoff authorizations
The
union for dues lost as a result of the subsequent revocations.
though the
Board ordered the employer to reimburse the union even
at which
contract,
the
of
solicitations occurred after the expiration
checkoffs
dues
time the employer could lawfully have suspended
entirely.
of
Members Zimmerman and Jenkins, overruling the decision
to that
the Administrative Law Judge, found the situation analogous
by
coerced
or
in which employees were unlawfully influenced
union
employers into paying dues, joining a union, or maintaining
that the
membership. Further, although the majority recognized
checkoff
contractual
the
employer could lawfully have discontinued
contract
the
of
mechanism for all employees upon the expiration
out that
without first securing any individual revocations, it points
Rather, the
that was not the course this employer chose to follow.
which were
employer here elected to seek individual revocations
conclusion
the
reaches
solicited in an unlawful manner. The majority
have
would
that, but for the employer's unlawful conduct, the union
persuaded by
continued to receive dues from employees who were
the employer to revoke.
dissent.
It is difficult not to be persuaded by Member Fanning's
caused
Fanning noted that the employer's conduct could not have
when
dues
some
of
monetary loss to the union; thus, reimbursement
an
seems
dues
all
the employer could lawfully have refused to deduct
has
Board
the
odd way to effect the purposes of the Act. Further,
meaningful
one
but
have
they
that
made it clear to all employers
to check
refuse
to
right
their
response at the expiration of a contract;
this
impose
to
wanted
off dues. It is unlikely that the Board majority
conditions" in the Board's
62. Surely the evocative power of phrases such as "laboratory
in literature or
dissertation
Ph.D.
a
for
adjudicatory process is a worthy subject
communications.
by Chairman Van de
63. For additonal comments on Conair and United Supermarkets
August 10, 1982,
Section,
Law
Employment
and
Labor
ABA
the
to
speech
water, see his
16.
at
1982
16,
reprinted in Legal Times of Washington, August
64. 259 NLRB No. 65, 109 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1981).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

13

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 8
Hofstra Labor Law Forum

[Vol. 1: 1

policy on all employers, but the decision in CardinalSystems leaves
employers little choice. In addition, the decision broadens
widely
(and not rationally) the actions for which an employer
can be held
legally and monetarily responsible. Again, enforcement
of this Board
ruling will likely be difficult to secure.
In other decisions that appear to be moving against the
current
trend, the Board in T.R.W., Inc. 6 5 and in Hammary Manufacturing
Corp.,66 effectively eliminated the efficacy of "no-solicitation"
rules.
In TRW, the Board, which had only three members
at the time,
unanimously held that any rule forbidding solicitations
during
"'working time" must specifically define
what "non-working time
periods" are so as to avoid all possibilities of confusion
and/or
discretionary enforcement. Chairman Van de Water
and Member
Hunter have bluntly stated their disagreement with the
TRW ruling.
In Intermedics, Van de Water and Hunter said that any no-solicitation
rule referring to "working time" is presumptively
valid. 67 In
Hammary, it was held that even a sole exception to a non-solicitation
rule, in this case a solicitation for contributions to the
United Way,
can invalidate the no-solicitation rule and make its
enforcement
during a union campaign a violation of the Act. 68 The Board
recently
amended its order in Hammary, making clear that a sole
exception to
a "no-solicitation" rule for the United Way campaign would
not be a
per se violation.69
COLLECmVE BARGAINING HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED

The decisions identified in the preceding section do more
than
return the collective bargaining mechanism to the hands
of the parties
with the "rules" unchanged; those decisions, and others
to be
discussed herein strengthen the collective bargaining
process
considerably. As part of that task, the adjudicatory bodies
have shown
a laudable willingness to confront the "hard" cases and bring
to them
an uncommon jolt of pragmatism. Principal among
the cases
representing this new view are those dealing with seniority.
Supreme Court Rulings
The role of seniority in hammering out any collective bargaining
agreement is, not unexpectedly, of extraordinary significance.
Both
the employers and the unions view length of service,
loyalty, and
65. 257 NLRB
66. 258 NLRB
67. 262 NLRB
68. 258 NLRB
69. 265 NLRB

No. 47, 107 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1981).
No. 182, 108 L.R.R.M. 1200 (1981).
No. 178 slip op. at 6, 110 L.R.R.M. 1441, 1443 (1982).
No. 182 slip op. at 2, 108 L.R.R.M. at 1200.
No. 7, 111 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1982).
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experience as attributes to be specially recognized. It is also true,
however, that seniority called by another name, incumbency,
represents perhaps the largest barrier to equal participation in our
society from the viewpoint of women and minorities. In short, when
the "pipeline" is full, there is no place for new entrants - even
without a breath of discriminatory intent. 70 The Supreme Court has
turned to this problem in a series of cases beginning in 1977 with
Teamsters v. United States. 7 1 In sum, the Court has held on repeated
occasions that only when seniority is used as the intentionalvehicle to
establish or to maintain discrimination in its workforce can it be
challenged. In cases decided this term, for example, PullmanStandardv. Swint, 72 and American Tobacco Company v. Patterson,73
the Court appears to have written the final paragraph in this chapter.
By deciding in Patterson that the seniority exception in § 703 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196474 is not limited to seniority systems
adopted before the effective date of that Act, and in Swint by again
noting that disparate impact alone is insufficient to invalidate a
seniority system, the Court has removed any claim based on an
alleged discriminatory seniority system as a cause of action except in
certain clearly defined cases. 75 Behind the Court's decisions in
Patterson and Swint is what was in the fore in its ruling in California
Brewers Association v. Bryant.76 There, the Court made clear that it
would uphold a seniority system even when and, indeed, precisely
because it was one of those gnarled, peculiar, odd constructs that
could only be the product of free collective bargaining over a long
period of time. The adjustments made to the seniority system at issue
70. For a more extended examination of this topic, see Tallent and Kilberg, From Bakke
to Fullilove: The Use of Racial and Ethnic Preferences in Employment, 6 EMP. REL. L.J. 364
(1980-81).
71. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
72. -U.S.-, 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982).
73. -U.S.-, 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
75. One of the remaining aspects of the seniority issue, that pitting the mandates of
affirmative action against the principles of incumbency, may soon be resolved by the Supreme
Court. The Court has recently agreed to hear Boston Firefighters Union Local 718 v. Boston
Chapter NAACP, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. granted 51 U.S.L.W. 3339 (U.S. Nov. 2,
1982) (No. 82-185). At issue is whether the State Civil Service law authoritzing seniority-based
layoffs could be overridden to assure adequate minority representation in the workforce in
accordance with the provisions of a consent decree. Shortly before accepting the Boston
Firefighterscase, the Supreme Court denied cert. in a similar case regarding the layoffs of white
teachers in the city school system under the terms of a 1974 busing order. Local 66, Boston
Teachers Union v. Boston School Com. et al., 671 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied 51
U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982). The divisions within the Court that are revealed by these
apparently contradictory decisions regarding what cases it would hear presage another
splintered ruling in this area of the law.
76. 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
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in Bryant appeared to the Court to be accommodations to
requirements of the work situation which could only have found
expression through the idiom of collective bargaining. Absent proof of
discriminatory intent, such seniority systems will not be invalidated.
The Court's support for these collectively bargained seniority
systems, however, should not be construed as creating a blanket
validation for any such discrimination as bargaining may yield. On the
contrary, the holding in United Steelworkers v. Weber 7 7 made clear
that a collectively bargained apprenticeship program that gave
preference to minorities did not violate Title VII. Private parties to
collective bargaining agreements are, thus, generally free to negotiate
affirmative action programs as they see fit without the fear of
themselves violating either Title VII or the National Labor Relations
Act. In short, the Court, in its decisions from Teamsters through
Bryant and Weber to Swint and Patterson, has made clear that the
parties are free to negotiate as they see fit those aspects of the
workplace which are creatures of collective bargaining, so long as they
do not otherwise violate the law. Thus, for the most part, collective
bargaining agreements are once again no different from any other
contracts.
The Court's positive attitude toward collective bargaining was
not limited in recent years to the issue of seniority or to the matter of
Title VII. A number of other equally important decisions make clear
that the collective bargaining process is to be given renewed
significance. In Teamsters v. Daniel,78 for example, the Court
decided that collectively bargained, non-contributory pension plans
did not create rights and obligations under the federal securities laws.
Thus, the employer and the union can bargain about pensions as they
would work hours, vacations, or any other term and condition of
employment, free from the uncontemplated burdens of § 10(b)(5). 79
Indeed, some employers, struggling to understand their obligations
under ERISA, 80 may very well be willing'to trade the requirements of
ERISA for those of the '34 Act. The shadow of Daniel was seen
recently in another Supreme Court case, UMW Health and
Retirement Funds v. Robinson.8 ' There, the court held that the
77.
608 F.2d
78.
79.

443 U.S. 193 (1979). On this point, see Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Young,
671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
439 U.S. 551 (1979).
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).

80.

See supra note 10.

81.

- U.S.-, 102 S. Ct. 1226 (1982).
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cannot be reviewed
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
8 2 of the LMRA. 83
302(c)(5)
§
for "reasonableness" under
Finally, on an occasion of some significance, the Court found the
challenge of technology to be one ideally suited for solution through
84
the collective bargaining process. The Court reminded the Board
that it should leave to bargaining the possibility that the parties can
negotiate an agreement that would accommodate their interests and
the demands of advanced technology:
[Any determination about the Work Rules] will, of course, be
informed by an awareness of the Congressional preference for
collective bargaining as the method for resolving disputes over
dislocations caused by the introduction of technological innovations in the workplace. Thus, in judging the legality of a
thoroughly bargained and apparently reasonable accommodation
to technological change, the question is not whether the Rules
represent the most rational or efficient response to innovation, but
jobs.8 5
whether they are a legally permissible effort to preserve
Board Rulings
The positions taken by the Supreme Court toward collective
bargaining also have been reflected by the Board. In a series of
decisions that are certain to return strength and vigor to the collective
bargaining process, the Board unanimously ruled that a union, as part
of its collective bargaining responsibility, is to be given very broad
information concerning employee health and safety. In Minnesota
87
86
Mining and Manufacturing Company; Borden Chemical; and
88
Colgate-Palmolive Company, the Board ruled that information
concerning monitoring and testing systems, devices and equipment,
including statistical data concerning such information, was required
for the union properly to meet its bargaining obligations.
Furthermore, the parties are to bargain in good faith regarding a
union's request for information which constitutes proprietary trade
secrets. Significantly, the Board reached this conclusion not because
of "the obligations imposed by other agencies or statutes, but solely
82.. § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
83. [When neither the collective bargaining process nor its end product violates any
of a
command of Congress, a federal court has no authority to modify the substantive terms
1234.
at
Ct.
S.
102
at-,
-U.S.
contract.
collective bargaining
84. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Assn., AFL-CIO, 447 U.S. 490 (1980).
85. Id. at 511. [citation omitted]
86. 261 NLRB No. 2, 109 L.R.R.M. 1345 (1982).
87. 261 NLRB No. 6, 109 L.R.R.M. 1358 (1982).
88. 261 NLRB No. 7, 109 L.R.R.M. 1352 (1982).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

17

HofstraHofstra
Labor Labor
and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 8
Law Forum
[Vol. 1: 1

upon the bargaining obligations imposed by the National Labor
Relations Act."-8 9 The Board's action in "3M" is as creative as the
solutions Member Hunter, in his concurrence, hoped would be
forthcoming, such as a Board-granted Protective Order. 90 Of course,
as with all attempts at innovative decision-making, the ruling in "3M"
creates some problems. As Member Hunter notes, the Board has
stated it is now prepared to answer the very difficult question of how
the validity of a "trade secret" defense will be determined, but he
aptly notes that this is an area in which the Board has little
expertise. 9 1 Neither Hunter nor the majority goes on to note that the
area of trade secrets may very well be one in which the Board lacks
jurisdiction as well as experience.
More significantly, the Board's decision raises the problem of
what course can be followed if the parties bargain in good faith and
still cannot reach a resolution. The Board has stated that "[i]f
necessary, we shall undertake the task of balancing the Union's right
of access to data relevant to collective bargaining with Respondent's
expressed confidentiality concerns in accordance with the principles
set forth in the Supreme Court's Detroit Edison decision."92 What
remains at issue in any attempted resolution by the Board is the
well-settled principle that when the parties have bargained in good
faith on a mandatory subject, no external entity, including the Board,
can either insist that the parties reach agreement or impose an
agreement upon them. 93
NEW

REMEDIES AND CAUSES OF ACTION WILL NOT BE CREATED

As part of the general trend of leaving the parties involved in
collective bargaining to their own devices, the courts and the Board
89. Id. slip op. at 10, n. 13, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1356, n. 13. In NLRB v. Tamara Foods,
Inc., 692 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982), the Eighth Circuit, although not citing "3M," affirmed the
Board's ruling that the OSH Act does not limit its jurisdiction and that the rights guaranteed to
employees by the NLRA are superior to the provisions of the OSH Act.
90. If they cannot agree, we are then faced with the very difficult question of how the
Board will determine the validity of a trade secret defense since this is an area in which
we have little expertise-and the extent to which the Board can alleviate an
employer's concerns about confidentiality by issuing a protective order. These are
problems which may require creative solutions from the Board if we are to follow the
command of the Supreme Court in Detroit Edison not to permit "union
interests ... [to] predominate over all other interests, however legitimate. . ." 440
U.S. at 318, 100 LRRM 2728. We must accommodate the competing concerns of both
parties.
Id. at No. 2 slip op. at 27, n. 30, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1352, n. 30.

91. Id.
92. 261 NLRB No. 7 slip op. at 18-19, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1358.
93. See 361 U.S. 477. The Oil and Chemical Workers have based their appeal of the
Board's ruling, in part, on the lack of certainty created by relegating the disclosure issue to
bargaining. OCAW, Local 6-418 v. NLRB, 232 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at D (Dec. 2, 1982).
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also have demonstrated a singular reluctance to create new remedies
and/or causes of action that might weaken the central role of collective
bargaining in dealing with workplace problems.

Supreme Court Rulings
The recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Summit Valley
94
Industries v. Local 12, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, is
instructive. There, in the face of a number of circuit court decisions to
the contrary, 95 the Supreme Court ruled that attorneys' fees incurred
in prior Board proceedings are not a proper element of damages
under § 303(b) of the LMRA. 96 Basing its decision on the
preeminence of the "American Rule," the Court held that in the
absence of clear support for damages in the statute or in the legislative
history, there would be no alteration in the traditional damages
awards. 97 Again, students of the Court's recent rulings in the labor
field might well have anticipated its decision in Summit Valley. Since
98
at least its decision in Carbon Fuel Company v. UMW, where the
Court held that an international union could not be held liable for
damages arising from the unauthorized strikes of local unions, the
Court has shown that it intends to read and construe labor statutes
narrowly. This course was followed in United Parcel Service, Inc. v.
Mitchell. 99 In Mitchell, a grievant, found to have been properly
discharged under the collectively bargained grievance and arbitration
procedure, brought a suit against the employer and the union under
§ 301(a) of the LMRA100 alleging a breach of the duty of fair
representation and of the contract. In a potentially far-reaching
decision, the Court held that such a suit must be filed within the
statute of limitations for vacating arbitration awards and not the
usually more generous limitation period for breach of contract
actions. 10 1 The Court went out of its way to indicate that one of the
bases for its decision was that to rule otherwise would be to
94. 50 U.S.L.W. 4560 (U.S. Jun. 1, 1982).
95. Texas Distributions, Inc. v. Local Union No. 100, 598 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1979);
Associated General Contractors of Minnesota v. Construction and General Laborers Local No.
563, 612 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1979); and Local Union No. 984, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Humko 287 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 366 U.S. 962 (1961), all holding
that attorney's fees can be recovered. F.F. Instrument Corp. v. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto
Rico, 558 F.2d 607, 611 (1st Cir. 1977) expressing approval, in dicta, of the recovery of
attorney's fees. Mead v. Retail Clerks Local 839, 523 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1975) holding that
attorney's fees are not recoverable under § 303(b) 29 U.S.C. § 187(b).
96. § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976).
97. 50 U.S.L.W. 4560, 4561.
98. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
99. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
100. § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
101. 451 U.S. at 64.
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undermine and to debilitate the collective bargaining process. The
Court noted that a collectively bargained grievance and arbitration
process "could easily become unworkable if a decision which has
given 'meaning and content' to the terms of an agreement, and even
effected subsequent modifications of the agreement, could suddenly
be called into question as much as six years later."1 0 2
Similarly, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis,10 3 individual
employees were not liable for damages under § 301(a) of the Act for
violating the no-strike provision of the collective bargaining
agreement. The Court refused to create a new avenue of recovery
under color of the Act. The anomalous creation of a group of people
apparently free from the threat of monetary recovery, analyzed in the
dissent, was without effect on the majority, who chose in this case, as
in others, to construe the reach of federal labor law narrowly.
Much the same impulse underlies Northwest Airlines v.
TransportWorkers Union of America. 10 4 There, the Court was asked
to deal with the vexing problem of a collectively bargained pay scale
which was found to be in violation of the Equal Pay Act. 10 5 The
employer, relying on the fact that the offending pay scale was the
product of collective bargaining, asked the Court to recognize a right
of contribution from the union even though the plaintiff had chosen to
sue only the employer. The Court, following traditional lines, held
that an employer found liable for damages has neither a statutory nor
a common law right of contribution from the union with whom it
bargained, even though the Court recognized that the bargaining
process was a bipartite endeavor.' 0 6
Board Rulings
These decisions of the Supreme Court construing the labor law
statutes narrowly, have recently made an impact on the decisions of
the Board. A number of decisions by the Board during the last two
years have had the dual effect of strengthening collective bargaining
102. Id. Several Circuit Courts of Appeal have relied on Mitchell to limit litigation of
arbitral decisions. See, e.g., Adams v. Gould, Inc., 687 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (arbitrator's
decision is not justiciable); McNutt v. Airco Indus'l Gases Div., 687 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1982)
(action barred by Massachusetts' 30-day statute of limitations), and San Diego County District
Council of Carpenters v. Cory, 685 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1982) (California's 100-day limitations
period operates to bar the action). But see, Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service, 51 U.S.L.W. 4051
(U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 81-525), and discussion at note 13, supra.
103. 451 U.S. 401 (1981).
104. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
105. § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
106. 451 U.S. at 93. But see Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service, supra note 13, in which the
Court held that the union and the employer were each responsible for a share of the monetary
damages growing from a breach of the duty of fair representation.
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and of preserving the traditional roles of parties to collective
bargaining. In GTE Automatic Electric Inc.107 the Board appears to
have set itself on a new path regarding the validity of "zipper clauses."
1°8
Although the Board specifically does not disturb earlier cases, in
this instance it reverses the position it took in 1979 in this very case.
In the earlier instance, 10 9 the Board ruled that the employer was
obligated to bargain with the union because the waiver or zipper
clause was not effective to extinguish the right to negotiate about a
benefit that was neither in existence nor proposed at the time of the
contract. After the circuit court denied enforcement of the Board's
order, on reconsideration the Board found that the employer did not
violate the Act by invoking the "zipper clause as a shield against the
Union's mid-term demand for bargaining over a new benefit and by
giving literal effect to the parties' waiver of their bargaining
rights, ..."110 Noting that the employer seeks nothing more than to
have what the parties had agreed to, the Board concludes that the
union "has waived its right to require [the employer] to bargain
midterm about new subject matter not specifically covered by the
terms of the existing contract. Certainly, our decision properly adds
and accords stability and dignity to the parties' collective-bargaining
relationship and the contract negotiated therefrom.",-"
Although ideologues may maintain that the Board's ruling in
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company,"12 in which the Board
extended the protections of Weingarten, was at a polar remove from
the Board's ruling in GTE Automatic Electric Inc., Pacific Telephone,
in fact, serves as another example of the Board's attempt to support
collective bargaining agreements. In Pacific Telephone, the Board
found that an employer violated § 8(a)(1) by refusing to inform
employees or their union representative of the nature of a matter
being investigated as well as by refusing to allow the employees a
consultation with a union steward before their interviews. The Board
found not only an employee right to consultation with a union steward
prior to an employer interview, but the Board also required that the
subject matter of the interview be indicated to the employees and the
107. 261-NLRB No. 196, 110 L.R.R.M. 1193 (1982).
108. See, e.g., Proctor Manufacturing Corporation, 131 NLRB 1166, 48 L.R.R.M. 1222
(1961); Unit Drop Forge Division Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc., 171 NLRB 600, 68 L.R.R.M. 1129
(1968) enforced in relevant part 412 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1960); Conval-Ohio, Inc., 202 NLRB 85,
82 L.R.R.M. 1701 (1973); and Pepsi-Cola Distributing Company of Knoxville, Tennessee, Inc.,
241 NLRB 869, 100 L.R.R.M. 1626 (1979).
109. GTE Automatic Electric Inc., 240 NLRB 297, 100 L.R.R.M. 1204 (1979).
110. 261 NLRB No. 196 slip op. at 4, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1193.
111. Id. at 5, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1194.
112. 262 NLRB No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1982).
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union steward prior to their consultation. 1 13 The inevitable result of
Pacific Telephone is to strengthen the role of the bargaining
representative and to maintain and support the provisions of the
collectively bargained grievance procedure. Some will agree with the
dissent of Member Hunter that Pacific Telephone improperly extends
the rule in Weingarten,1 14 but it appears that whatever the
precedential base for Pacific Telephone, the decision reached there
by the Board will draw the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement into closer interdependence.
A "counter-trend" exists here, as well. In Materials Research
Corp.,1 15 the Board, in a 3-2 vote, ruled that "Weingarten rights"
apply to unorganized employees. The majority held that the § 7110
right to mutual aid and protection is not created by the presence of a
union. The Board pointed out that where there is no union,
"Weingarten rights" are likely to be more necessary. Chairman Van
de Water and Member Hunter dissented with Van de Water focusing
on the threat of a multiplicity of employee representatives that the
Board's decision creates. Now, if an employer is required to deal with
representatives of individual, non-unionized employees, rather than
deal freely with such employees, then the spectre of splinter group
bargaining appears. The Board's reasoning in Materials Research is
difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's ruling in Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org.117 In Emporium
Capwell, the Court supported an underlying Board ruling that § 7
rights inhere in the duly elected representative and that
representative could not be circumvented by splinter groups of
employees. If individual employees now enjoy such rights absent any
union, by what rational principle are splinter groups within organized
118
units to be refused?
The unique statutorially sanctioned relationship between the
employer and the Board-certified collective bargaining representative
was emphasized in two other recent decisions by the Board: RCA Del
113. Id. at 4-5, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412-1413.
114. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
115. 262 NLRB No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. 1401 (1982).
116. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
117. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
118. The Board may give some indication of how it will sort out the problems posed by
individual employees, organized or not, when it rules on pending cases growing from the
Board's decision in Alleluia Cushion, 221 NLRB 999, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1975). The narrow
issue is whether a single employee's conduct is "concerted" if its results can affect more than one
employee or whether "concerted activity" under § 7 must be undertaken by two or more
employees. The larger issues, however, go the the primacy of "exclusivity" in American labor
law and all that entails for collective bargaining.
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Caribe, Inc. 1 19 and Abraham Grossman d/bla Bruckner Nursing
Home. 120 In both instances, the Board concluded that the Midwest
Piping121 doctrine of employer neutrality necessarily need not apply
when a rival union merely appears on the scene. In BrucknerNursing
Home, two unions, Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home &
Allied Health Services Unions, S.E.I.U., and Local 1115, Joint
Board, Nursing Home and Hospital Employees Division, were in the
process of organizing the employer. Local 144 notified the employer
that it possessed a majority of signed authorization cards whereas
Local 1115 informed the employer that it was engaged in
organizational activity and that the employer should not extend
recognition to any other labor organization. Local 1115 then filed
charges against the employer and its rival union alleging violations of
the Act. A subsequent card count conducted by an extension
specialist of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations indicated that Local 144 represented a majority of the
employees. The employer, however, refused to recognize any union
pending the outcome of the unfair labor practice charges. Those
charges were dismissed by the Regional Director and negotiations
between Local 144 and the employer commenced, culminating in a
collective bargaining agreement. Local 1115 then filed new charges.
Identifying its decisions in this and in the companion case, RCA
del Caribe, as re-evaluating the Midwest Piping doctrine, the Board,
taking note that circuit courts refused to enforce many of the decisions
based on the doctrine, announced that it
will no longer find 8(a)(2) violations in rival union, initial
organizing situations when an employer recognizes a labor
organization which represents an uncoerced, unassisted majority,
before a valid petition for an election has been filed with the Board
[by the rival union]. However, once notified of a valid petition,
22
employer must refrain from recognizing any of the rival unions.1
In RCA del Caribe, the Board set forth a new policy with respect
to the requirements of employer neutrality when an incumbent is
challenged by an "outside" union. The Board specifically overruled
Shea Chemical Corporation,12 3 which held that an employer faced
with a pending petition from an outside union must cease collective
bargaining with the incumbent and maintain a posture of strict
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

262 NLRB No. 116, 110 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1982).
262 NLRB No. 115, 110 L.R.R.M. 1374 (1982).
Midwest Piping and Supply Company, Inc., 63 NLRB 1060, 17 L.R.R.M. 40 (1945).
262 NLRB No. 115 slip op. at 9-10, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1376-77.
121 NLRB 1027, 42 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1958).
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neutrality with respect to both the incumbent and the challenging
labor organization. In RCA del Caribe, the Board established a new
precedent and determined that "the mere filing of a representation
petition by an outside, challenging union will no longer require or
permit an employer to withdraw from bargaining or from executing a
contract with an incumbent union." 124 The Board demonstrated a
new awareness of the economic realities facing an employer in
reaching this conclusion. Noting that an employer with an existing
bargaining relationship will find it virtually impossible to observe
strict neutrality and observing further that either to stop bargaining or
to continue to bargain may be construed as an activity in favor of
either the incumbent or the rival union, the Board decided to permit
the employer to continue to bargain with the incumbent union as the
i2 5
best way to "approximate employer neutrality.'
This more practical and realistic attitude of the Board also is seen
in some "procedural" decisions that, taken together, promise to
"streamline" proceedings and to permit labor and management
to
proceed to bargaining, when appropriate.
In Hydro Conduit Corporation,126 the Board voted 3-2 to
change its policy regarding its treatment of unambiguous but
improperly marked ballots. In Hydro Conduit, the Board reversed a
policy of some 11 years standing, first stated in Columbus Nursing
Home Inc.,127 and decided to honor ballots on which the voter's
intent was clearly marked even though that intent had not been
indicated in the proper place. In recognizing the refusal of several
courts of appeal to respect the old Board doctrine, and in responding
to the appellate courts' views, the Hydro Conduit decision exhibits
practicality not often exhibited by the Board 28 in the past.
124. 262 NLRB No. 116 slip op. at 10-11, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
125. Id. at 10. Using its decision in RCA del Caribeas its rationale, the Board, in Dresser
Industries, Inc., 264 NLRB No. 145, 111 L.R.R.M. 1436 (1982), has further limited the
occasions which permit the parties to refuse to bargain. In Dresser, the Board held that the
filing of a decertification petition, standing alone, does not provide reasonable grounds to
question a union's majority status and to refuse to bargain. Dresser explicitly over-rules the
Board's decision in Telautograph Corp., 199 NLRB 892, 81 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1972).
126. 260 NLRB No. 176, 109 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1982).
127. 188 NLRB 825, 76 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1971).
128. In Columbus Nursing Home, Inc., the Board declared its policy of not counting a
ballot which contains no marking on its face regardless of how clearly the intent of the voter was
indicated on the reverse side of the ballot. The courts of appeal have been unmoved by the
Board's reasoning. In NLRB v. Manhattan Corporation, Manhattan Guest House, Inc., 660
F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1980), Robert Door and Window Company v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 350 (9th Cir.
1976), Mycalex Division of Spaulding Fibre Company, Inc. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1972) and NLRB v. Titch-Goettinger Company, 433 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1970), the appellate
courts decided that the Board was not free to ignore a ballot when it was unambiguously marked
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In The Broyhill Company,12 9 the issue was whether an employer
adequately had repudiated the unlawful statements of a supervisor
which were made during an election campaign. Specifically, a
supervisor admitted making statements to the effect that the
employer would "probably shut the doors" if the union came in,
coupled with other less serious threats. Five weeks after the
statements were made, but only one day after the employer learned
of them, the employer posted a notice to all employees specifically
disavowing the statement made by the supervisor, and stating that it
would not in any manner interfere with the employees' § 7 rights.
At issue was whether this repudiation was sufficient to "cleanse"
the employer of the unfair labor practice committed by its supervisor.
Van de Water, Zimmerman, and Hunter decided that it did.
Emphasizing the rapidity with which the employer acted once it
learned of the supervisor's comments and the breadth of the
employer's disavowal, the Board concluded that the employer did all
it reasonably could do to disavow the unlawful conduct of the
supervisor. Thus, the Board decided that the employer met the
0
standards set forth in Passavant Memorial Area Hospital.13
CONCLUSION

Additional instances of the new trend in the law of
labor-management relations could be added almost endlessly, but the
aim of this paper is not to walk the path the trend has taken but,
rather, to mark it and to note its significance. As believers in the
collective bargaining process and believing that through the process
we can arrive at cogent approaches even to difficult social and
economic problems, we welcome any measures that return real
authority to the parties to collective bargaining. Some approaches
very well may affect only a few plants, some a whole industry, but
those who believe that collective bargaining can be carried out in a
framework which lets the parties deal with their own real problems,
free from additional external impediments, have no reason to fear the
future.
regardless of where on the ballot the marking appeared. The Supreme Court refused to grant
certiorari [NLRB v. Manhattan Corporation, Manhattan Guest House, Inc. 452 U.S. 916 (1981)]
and the matter was left in an uneasy balance until the Hydro Conduit decision.
129. 260 NLRB No. 183, 109 L.R.R.M. 1314 (1982).
130. 237 NLRB 138, 98 L.R.R.M. 1492 (1978).
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